



THE COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES.'
SECOND ARTICLE.
§ 36. (I.) Of incompetency from a relation not as party creating
an interest in the suit. A person to be held incompetent under this
rule, must be offered, not to testify against his interests, but under
such circumstances that he may testify in favor of his own interest.2
It is said the interest here intended must be a legal interest ;3 and
it is conceived, as has already been stated," that to be such it must
be essentially pecuniary in its nature. For it is certain, that no
similarity of situation with the party producing the witness, ' no
mere hopes or expectations of benefit, however strong ;6 no bias
resulting from friendship or hatred or consanguinity, as fear or
favor; 7 no mere honorary obligation;8 no domestic tie or social relation
'Continued from page 27.
2 1 Greenlf. Ev. 410.
3 1 Phil. Bv. 86; 1 Greenlf. Ev. H 408, 394, 402, 386, Hodsdon vs. Wilkins, 7
Greenlf. 113; Humphreys vs. Miller, 4 C. & P. 7.
4 Ante, 21. For an exception, see ante, J 29, 31.
5 1 Phill. Ev. 119; Sargeant vs. Gutterson, 13 N. Ramp. 467; 1 Greenlf Ev.
408; Bent vs. Baker, 3 Term R. 27; Rollins vs. Taylor, 25 Maine, 144.
1 Phill. Ev. 86,119; authorities last cited; PhUlbrookvs. Handley, 27 Maine, 56, 58.
7 1 Leach's C Cases, 151; Rudd's case 2 11. P. C. 280; 1 Phill. Ev. 119 ; 1 Greenlf.
Ev. 386; 1 Phill. Ev. 69.
8 Fink vs. McClung, 4 Gilman, 569; Vanmeter, vs. McFadden, 8 B. Monroe, 435;
Ilopkinsu vs. Holmes, 18 Verm. 18; State vs. Poteet, 7 Iredell, 356; 1 Phill. Ev.
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(except that of husband or wife,) no mere belief or supposition of
interest,' nor any other motive by which human conduct is determined;
nothing except a legal interest in the result ;2 will render a person
incompetent. But it may well be considered by the jury how far
such relations and states of mind should affect the credibility of the
witness ;3 the reason for rejecting persons interested as parties is
conceived to be essentially the same as that for rejecting the parties
themselves.
4
§ 37. It has been said that the interest which renders a person
incompetent must be a legal interest, and that if it be such, its
magnitude is of no consequence.' Of course the rank or fortune of
the person interested is wholly immaterial.7  But if a person is
equally interested for both parties, he is competent for either; if
more for one than the other, he is not competent for that one.' We
128; 1 Stark. 102; Moore vs. Hitchcock, 4 Wend. 292; Union Bank vs. Knapp, 3
Pick. 96; Smith vs. Downs, 6 Conn. 865; Pond vs. Hartwell, 17 Pick. 272. The
rule may be more doubtful in England. Gresley 2Ev. 251; 1 Stark. Ev. 104, note,
(Metcalf's ed.); I Phill. Ev. 128.
I Post. 39, note.
2 1 Greenlf. Ev. 386; 1 Phill. Ev. 120.
3 1 Phill. Ev. 86, 119; 1 Greenlf. Ev. 386.
4 1 PhIl. Ev. 81; 1 Greenlf. Ev. 386. In this section Prof. Greenleaf says, the
reason for excluding persons having an interest in the suit is the same as "that
which excludes the parties themselves." It is true, he refers tu considerations of
public policy and to the danger of perjury. But it is conceived there is a radical
distinction between excluding one as "incompetent" and excluding him as " inad-
missible on grounds of public policy." Ante, 4, note. If there is no interest,
is there any danger of perjury? Does not danger of perjury imply interest? So
far, then, as the mere question of competency is concerned, will not the rules which
determine the competency of persons who are not parties, suffice also for persons
who are parties ?
5 Ante, 36.
6 Ante, 32; Burton vs. Hinde, 5 Term R. 175; Butter vs. Warren, 11 Johns. 57.
7 1 Greenlf. Ev. 391; 1 Phill. Ev. 86, 87. The law demands general rules.
8 1 Phill. 2Ev. 87; 1 Greenlf. Ev. 891, 399, 420. This rule is unquestionable
and uniform. The cases are very numerous. It will suffice to cite a few of the
ater ones. Hunt vs. Chambers, 7 S. & M. 532; Ellis vs. Berviflier, 15 Ohio, 489;
Morse vs. Green, 13 N. Hamp. 82; Kingsbury vs. Smith, 13 N. Hamp. 109. But
see Barnetts vs. Snowden, 5 Wend. 181 ; Hale vs. Hale, 8 Conn. 336.
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have seen that these principles apply equally to cases where the
interest is only in the costs of the suit, as to cases in which the
interest is in the subject matter.' If the person would be liable for
costs only in one event of the suit, he will be incompetent for that
party, which by prevailing, would fix the witness' liability.' It is of
no consequence in what manner the liability for costs arises ;3 it is
material only that it be a legal liability.4
§ 38. It having been made to appear that the interest must be
pecuniary in its nature ;5 as well as legal, 6 it seems necessary to
examine more in detail the elements of a legal interest.7 An inter-
est in the result of the suit, to be legal, and therefore to be such as
will render a person incompetent, must (1) be real, and, (2) it must be
certain, and (3,) it must be direct. But before proceeding further, it
may be laid down as a very general rule, (subject to qualifications
and exceptions to be hereafter mentioned;) that this legal interest
may exist, and will render a person incompetent to give evidence
when offered to prevent a verdict which will take away that which
belongs to him," or which will defeat a claim made against him ; or
Ante, 22, and authorities last cited; Kingsbury vs. Smith, 13 N. Harnp. 109.
The rule was formerly different in England, but now conforms to the rule stated in
the text, or rather did, before the late statutes already cited. Townsend vs. Down-
ings, 14 East, 565; post. J 43, note; ante, 22.
2 1 Greenlf. Ev. J 391; Larbelestier vs. Clark, 1 B. & Ad. 899; Kingsbury vs.
Smith, 13 N. Hamp. 109.
3 M3arland vs. Jefferson, 2 Pick. 240; Butter vs. Warren, 11 Johns. 57; Parker
vs. Vincent, 3 C. & P. 38 ; Rush vs. Flickwiro, 17 S. & R. 82 ; Riddle vs. Morse, 7
(Cranch, 206.
4 Ante, J 36, note.
5 Ante, J 86, note.
e Ante, 36, note.
7 In strict accuracy of language, a legal interest is the correlative of an illegal
interest, or such a claim as the law would not enforce on the ground of immorality,
fraud or public policy; and hence could not be used to express the aggregate of the
essential ingredients of that kind of interest which renders a person incompetent.
But it is conceived to be clear that the law gives to the phrase "legal interezt" a
much wider import: that it includes that kind and degree of interest, which renders
one incompetent. I have therefore so treated it. See ante, J 36, note.
8Jacks vs. Nichols, 3 Sandford's Ch. R. 313; Bowman vs. Noyes, 12 N. Hamp. 802:
9 Draper vs. W. and N. Railroad, 11 et. 505. Or to satisfy a claim; Taylor vs.
Pauillin, 11 Ala. 512; Carrington vs. Hilabird, 17 Conn. 530. 1 Greenlf. Ev. 393.
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to procure a verdict which will give him what belongs to another,"
or which will establish his claim against another.
2
§ 39. (1) When it is said an interest must be real, it is meant to
distinguish it from an interest which exists only in the belief or
supposition of the witness.3 Here again the law acts upon the
necessity of general rules. To measure the sincerity or influence
of the witness' belief would be an inquiry quite too difficult and meta-
physical for the purposes of judicial tribunals.' If the witness
might be rejected when he thinks he has an interest, but has none,
it is not readily perceived why he would not be competent when he
thinks he has no interest, and yet in fact is legally interested.
To adopt such a rule would be, at least, to allow every dishonest
man to be a witness or not at his pleasure.5 To be governed by
the actual interest is the safe and prevailing rule.> And we have
seen that a mere honorary obligation does not render one incompe-
tent.7 The interest must really be an interest in the suit, and not
merely an interest in the question to be decided.8 Hence in an
Or that may be made; but it must be certain to produce the result. Phibrook vs.
Hlandley, 27 Maine, 56.
'Cully vs. Ross, 7 Blackford, 312 ; Porter vs. B. of Rutland, 19 Vt., 4 Wash. 633.
2 Leiper vs. Gewin, 9 Ala. R. 326; Randall vs. Phillips, 3 Mason, 378. Or which
will prima facia establish a claim against another. Latham vs. Kenniston, 13
N. H. 203.
3 The authorities are not in harmony on this point. In England (before the late
statutes removing incompetency by reason of interest,) the rule of the text was by
no means clearly established. The prevailing doctrine in this country is that laid
down in the text. 1 Stark. Ev. 104, note (Metcalf's ed.); Gresley Ev. 251; Greenlf.
Ev. 387, 388; 6 Conn. 365; 18 Wend. 466; 8 Watts, 227; Pond vs. Hartwell, 17
Pick. 272; ante, 36, note; contra, 4 Bibb, 445; 2 J. J. Marsh, 391; 2 Mumf.
148; Plum vs. Whiting, 4 Mass. 518.
41 Phill. Ev. 127, 128; 1 Stark. Ev. 102; 1 Greenlf. Ev. 387.
5 Cochet vs. Dinon, 4 McCord; 311; where it was held, that the declarations of the
witness that he was interested were not sufficient to render him incompetent, and
that the party was entitled to have him examined. See also the People vs. McNair.
21 Wend. 608.
1 I Greenlf. Ev. 387; authorities cited in 36, note.
-Ante, 36, note.
s1 Greenlf. Ev. 389; Burt vs. Baker, 3 Term R. 27; Spurr vs. Pearson, 1 Mason, 104;
Owens vs. Speed, 5 Wheaton, 423; J. vs. H., 6 Cowen, 248; flandly vs. Call, 27
Maine, 3.5.
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action by one of several whose lands had been flowed by reason
of defendant's dam, and though the defendant claimed the right to
flow the lands of the others, as well as those of the plaintiff, they.
were held to be competent for the plaintiff.' So in an action for the
diversion of a water course, one of those living on the stream and
injuriously affected, is still competent for another (the plaintiff)
similarly situated.2  The interest is only in the question.3  Neither
the claim, the remedy, or the liability of the witness is changed by
the suit.
§ 40. (2,) When it is said the interest must be certain, it is
meant to exclude all doubtful or contingent interests. And it is
conceived that an interest is contingent, not when, the legal right
being 1erfect, it is merely uncertain whether in point offact it ever
will be enforced, but when it is uncertain whether the legal right or
possibility of enforcing it ever will be perfect. If it can be enforced
as a legal consequence of the suit, it is conceived it will render the
person who might acquire or lose it, incompetent, however uncertain
or improbable it may be that it ever will be enforced.' Hence in
Sargent vs. Gutterson, 13 N. Hamp. 467.
'parker vs. Griswold, 17 Conn. 288; and see Rollins vs. Taylor, 25 Maine, 144;
Stewart vs. Conner, 9 Ala. 803.
3 It would seem that all the numerous cases turning upon an interest in the ques-
tion would equally well illustrate the rule that the interest must be certain and not
contingent. For although the plaintiff may be deterred from bringing a second
action by his defeat in the first, (which may have been caused by the testimony of
him who might be a party in the second suit,) still as the result of the first suit
does not affect the legal :,ghts of the parties, but only the mere probability of a
second action as a matter of fact, the competency is not affected. The interest is
contingent. See post. 40, note. See 1 Greenlf. Ev. 400.
4 1 Phill. Ev. 81-86, 121, 122; 1 Greenlf. Ev. J 408, 409 ; Phibrook vs. Handley,
27 Maine, 56.
s So far as my examination has gone; but see Greenlf. Ev. 400, 397. I should
have been justified by the example of the learned writers on this branch of the law,
had I declined to give so much point to this statement. But I have not chosen to
be obscure, rather than hazard the danger of an error. There is no little obscurity
on this point, and there are some cases which seem to have lost sight of the distinc-
tion I have made. Nevertheless, I think it founded in reason and upon authority.
Cornell vs. Vanartsdeller, 4 Barr, 364; Hopkins vs. Holmes, 18 Vt. 18; Carringtoa
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an action against an administrator for a debt of the intestate, the
surety in the administrator's bond is competent for the adminis-
trator to prove a tender.' So a mariner, entitled to a share in a
prize, is competent for the captain in a suit by the captain for his
share of the prize.2 For, in the first case the result cannot make
it certain that the witness will lose, nor in the latter can it make it
certain that he will gain anything.3 So a surety to a surety is com-
petent for the first principal, it being uncertain whether the defeat
of the principal would affect the witness. 4  So a legatee is compe-
tent for a devisee, if there is no certain evidence that he may be
called upon to refund.5 But one who has become bail for another,6
or who endorses a writ and thereby becomes surety for costs,7 is not
competent, for their liability will be made certain by a judgment
adverse to their interest. Nor is one competent to increase a fund
out of which he is entitled to be paid.8 The cases are very nume-
rous upon this subject, and I can do no more than refer to them
generally. 9
vs. Holabird, 17 Conn. 530; Adams vs. Barrett, 3 Kelly, 277, id. 523; Williams vs
Little, 12 N. H. 29; Levers vs. Buskirk, 4 Barr, 309; Loud vs. Pierce, 25 'Maine,
(12 Ship,) 233; Allen vs. Adams, 17 Conn. 67; Jones vs. Brownfield, 2 Barr, 55; 1
Greenlf. Ev. ?. 408, 409. Perhaps all the cases of persons whose competency is
called in question on the ground of an interest in the record, turn on this distinction.
See ante, 39, note.
I Carter vs. Pierce, 1 Term R. 163.
2 Anon. Skin. 403.
3 Philbrook vs. Handley, 27 Maine, 56, illustrates the same principle. The right
of action is not made perfect by the judgment. There is a further contingency
arising upon matter of fact.
4Allen vs. Adams, 17 Conn. 67.
5 Levers vs. Vanbuskirk, 4 Barr, 309; Clarke vs. Gannon, Ry. & M. 31.
S1 Term R. 164; 3 Stark. 132.
Robert vs. Adam, 9 Greenlf. 9; Hall vs. Baylis, 15 Pick. 51; Salmon vs. Rance,
2 Serg. & R. 311.
s Cully vs. Ross, 7 Blackford, 312; Jacks vs- Nichols, 3 Sandford's Ch. R. 313.
'1 Greenlf. Ev. ? 392, 393, 408, 409,, supra, note. Parties to notes and bills
are generally competent in actions upon the notes, &c., because in most cases the
-witness is already liable to some one, or will in either event of the suit have
a remedy against some one. 1 Greenlf. Ev. 400, 401; 1 Phill. Ev. 110, 111 ;
Bayley on Bills, 586. 2 Stark. Ev. 179, 182. Seed 20 ante, as to the admissibility
of parties to notes.
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§ 41. (3) To render a person incompetent, his interest must be
direct. There are many cases, some of which are cited in the notes
to the last section, which equally well illustrate the present rule,
and the one just considered. But there are others which require to
be noticed in the present connection. The liability must be direct
to the party calling the witness, to render him incompetent.' If the
result of the suit would only make a person liable to some other indi-
vidual, who would be liable to the party, that person will still be
competent.2  Hence if A would be rendered liable to B, and B to
be a party, A is competent for that party.' So where an article
has been sold by successive vendors with like warranty, an antecedent
vendor will be competent for a subsequent one, if there be interme-
diate vendors who are liable.' 'The liability is too remote. But as
a general rule at least, a person who is liable to make good, to a
party, the title or quality of an article, w ill be incompetent for that
party, when such title or quality are in dispute.' And it is imma-
terial whether this liability originate in an express contract, or in
an implication of law ;> or whether the liability be to indemnify the
' 1 Greenlf. Ev. 37. And see Rex vs. Luckeep, Willes, 425; 1 Phill. Ev. 65,66.
2 Clarke vs. Lucas, Ry. & M. 32; Allen vs. Adams, 17 Conn. 67.
3 Allen vs. Carty et. al. 19 Vermont, 65.
' Clarke vs. Lucas, Ry. & M. 32; Martin vs. Kelly, 1 Sten. (Ala.) 198.
6 Serle vs. Serle, 2 Roll. Abr. 685; Steers vs. Carwandine, 8 C. & P. 570; Lewis vs.
Peake, 7 Taunt. 153; Biss vs. Mountain, 1 M. & Rob. 302. But see Baldwin vs.
Dixon, 1 M. & ftob. 59; Biggs vs. Crick, 5 Esp. 99. See also Kingsbury vs. Smith,
13 N. Hamp. 109. But the vendor -will not be incompetent unless his covenants or
agreements are such as to make him certainly liable in the event of the suit termi-
nating adversely to the party offering him. Lathrop vs. Muzzy, 5 Greenlf. 450;
Davis vs. Spooner, 3 Pick. 284; Adams vs. Cuddy, 13 Pick. 460; Beidelman vs.
Foulk, 5 Watts, 308.
62 Bla. Com. 451 ; 2 Kent's Com. 478; Elmerson vs. Bigham, 10 Mass. 203; (Rand's
ed.) Peto vs. Blades, 5 Taunt. 657; Mockbee vs Gardiner, 2 Har. & Gill, 176; Heer-
mance vs. Verney, 6 Johns. 5; Hale vs. Smith, 6 Greenlf. 416; Cow. & Hill's Notes
to 1 Phill. Ev. vol. 3, p. 1532.
If the person will be liable to one or the 6ther of the parties, in either event he
will be competent for either, unless he is liable for costs in one event and not in the
other. Kingsbury vs. Smith, 3 N. H. 109; Labalastier vs. Clarke, 1 B. & Ad. 899;
1 Starkie Ev. 109, note (n.) 2 Id. 894, note (a), 1 Greenlf. Ev. 393.
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party against the judgment itself, or only against some fact essential
to the rendition of the judgment.' If the effect of a judgment for
the plaintiff would be to confirm a person in the enjoyment of an
interest in possession 2 or would place him in the immediate enjoy-
ment of a right ;3 or if a person, as an underwriter, is to be refunded
a sum paid,4 in the event of the plaintiff's success; in none of these
cases, will the person having such direct interest be a competent
witness for the plaintiff.
§ 42. In further illustration of the rule, that a direct interest will
exclude a person, it may be laid down that no person is competent
to give testimony, the direct legal effect of which will be to place
him in a situation of entire security against a subsequent action.'
But it must sufficiently appear tha t such action could legally be
maintained. 6  Therefore, in an action against a principal for dam-
ages, occasioned by the misconduct of his servant or agent, the latter,
(if it sufficiently appear that he would be liable over to his master
'Forrester vs. Pigou, 3 Campb. 880; 1 M. & S. 9, S. C.; 1 Geeenlf. Ev. 897.
2 Doe vs. Williams, Cowp. 621. This was a case where a lessee was called by his
lessor, in ejectment.
3 Rex vs. Williams, 9 B. & C. 549.
4 Forrester vs. Pigou, 3 Campb. 380; 1 M. & S. 9, S. 0.
5 Draper vs. W. & N. Railroad, 11 Met. 505. But a prima facie evidence at least
of a right of action against the -witness, must appear. Holabird vs. Carrington, 17
Conn. 580; post. 43, note. See Latham vs. Kenniston, 13 N. Hamp. 203.
6 1 Greenlf. Ev. 394. Though Prof. Greenleaf has laid down ths rule in such
general and unqualified language that it would render a witness incompetent to
testify in every case where he is threatened with a suit; yet it is conceived it should
be regarded as applicable only in those cases where the legal -right to bring such suit
is certain; or in other words, -where aprima facie case appears against the witness.
Otherwise it would seem the interest is only contingent. Carrington vs. Holabird,
17 Conn. 540; Taylor et. al. vs. United States, 3 Howard, 306; Barnes vs. Cole, 21
Wend. 189; Carter vs. Pearce, 1 Term R. 162; 2 Stark. Ev. 762; Dudley vs. Bolles,
24 Wend. 465; Levers vs. Buskirk, 4 Barr, 309; Van Meter vs. McFadden, 8 B. Monroe,
435. It is conceived that it cannot be laid down as an unqualified rule, that the
bare fact that a person's testimony "will prevent a suit being brought against him,"
will render him incompetent. 3 Howard, U. S. R; 306; 17 Conn. 540; Smith vs.
Seward, 3 Barr, 342. Though he would be incompetent if his evidence would defeat
a prima facie case Latham vs. Kenneston, 13 N. Hamp. 203.
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in another action)' will not be competent for the defendant without
a release.2 In most such cases he would be liable over to his mas-
ter or principal to refund the damages recovered by the plaintiff in
the first action. The principle is one of extensive application. As
to a shipmaster' to a wagoner,4 to a sheriff's officer,' to a broker ;6 to
the guard of a coach 7, to a pilot," to a creditor in an action against
an officer ;9 where, in the several cases referred to a judgment for
the party adverse to the one calling the witness, would have exposed
the witness to an action by the party calling him, and in some of
them, at least, would have fixed the quantum of damages for which
the witness would be liable.
§ 43. So if a person is to pay a sum of money to the plaintiff, if
the plaintiff fail in the suit, guch person is clearly incompetent for
the plaintiff." So when one aqtion is to abide the event of another,
all the parties have a direct interest." So in an action against a
surety on a joint and several bond, the surety cannot call the prin-
cipal to prove payment by the latter; for the witness has an interest
in favor of the surety to the amount of costs.' 2  So one liable to an-
action -himself, is not a competent witness to sustain an action against
'Barnes vs. Coles, 21 Wend. 189; Hobbes vs. Paddock, 19 Wend. 456; and
authorities cited in last note: In the cases cited from Wendell there may be reason
for saying the actions were for the negligence of the master. But see 11 Met. 505;
Draper vs. W. N. Railroad, 11 Mete. 505. See also Smith vs. Seward, 3 Barr, 342.
1 Greenlf. Er. 394.
'De Sequard vs. De la Tour, 2 New Rep. 374.
4 Holabird vs. Carrington, 17 Conn. 530.
5 Powell vs. Rand, 1 .Stra. 650; Brown vs. Bradley, 8 C. & P. 500. So under
analagous circumstances, the creditor is also incompetent. Jewet.t vs. Adams, 8
Greeulf. R. 30; Turner vs. Austin, 16 Mass. 181.
6 Field vs. Mitchell, 6 Esp. 71; Boorman vs. Brown, 1 P. & D. 364.
'Whittemore vs. Waterhouse, 4 C. & P. 383.
8 Hawkins vs. Finlayson, 3 C. & P. 305. But if his interest is balanced, he is
competent. Vaisin vs. Ins. Co., 1 Wilcox, 283.
9 Keightly vs. Birch, 3 Campb. 521; Turner vs. Austin, 16 Mass. 181; Rice vs.
Wilkins, 8 Shepley's Maine R. 558;
10 Frothingham vs. Greenwood, 1 Stra. 129.
11Forrester vs. Pigou, 1 M. & S. 9; 1 Greenlf. Ev. 395.
12 Townsend vs. Downng, 5 East, 565. See for an analagous principle, Griffin vs.
Brown, 2 Pick. 304; Lefferts vs. De Mott, 21 Wend. 136. As to an interest in costs
generally, see ante, 22, note. But sed Burt vs. Kershaw, 2 East, 460.
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another which will discharge his own liability.' Hence a servant
or agent mayJ not be competent for his master or principal to prove
an injury to the master's property by a stranger whilst it was in the
custody of the servant or agent.'
§ 44. The interest which renders a person incompetent must be
an interest in the suit, and not an interest in the question mereTy.
The cases are very numerous, and the principle well settled. It is
certain that no mere similarity of situation, or right, exposing a
person to, or giving him a right to maintain a like action, or an
action upon like evidence;3 if the direct legal effect of the judgment
does not give, or confirm him in some right, or take some right from
him, it will render him incompetent.4 Hence one freeholder is com-
petent for another claiming under the same title,' one devisee for
another claiming under the same will;6 one person whose lands are
flooded by reason of a dam, for another whose lands are flooded by
the same dam.7 But this subject has already been partially discussed,
and may be here dismissed with the remark, that the rule itself is
much clearer than the cases to which it is to be applied."
§ 45. It may be further observed, that the principles which we
have now laid down under the head of "a relation not as parties
Emerton vs. Andrew, 4 Mass. 653; Hockson vs. Marshall, 7 C. & P. 16; ante, 38.
2Moorish vs. Foote, 8 Taunt. 454; Sherman vs. Barnes, 1 M. & Rob. 69. But
this doctrine is by no means satisfactorily established. The interest would seem to
be no more than contingent. See I Greenlf. Ev. J 396, note (1) 544, 3d ed; also the
authorities cited ante, 42, note; especially Holabird vs. Carrington, 17 Conn.
540; where the general doctrine is doubted, though the decision was not directly
upon the point. Johnson vs. Marsh, 2 Bail. 18.2l; McDowell vs. Simpson, 3 Watts,
129, 134; 2d Part. Cowen & Hill's Notes to Phill. Ev., Supplement, 1525-1530. As
to the difference in the principle whether the master be plaintiff or defendant, see
Faucourt vs. Ball, 1 Bing, (N. C.) 681, 688. The servant is legally incompetent,
(if his negligence or liability to an action sufficiently appears) in either case.
5 Handley vs. Call, 27 Maine, 35.
Evans vs. Eaton, 7 Wheaton, 356; Evans vs. Hettich, ibid 453; Steward vs. Rip,
5 Johns. 256, ante, 36; Rollins vs. Taber, 25 Maine, 144; Parker vs. Griswold,
17 Conn. 288; Holabird vs. Carrington, 17 Conn. 530.
0 Richardson vs. Carey, 2 Rand, 87; Owens vs. Speed, 5 Wheat. 423.
e Jackson vs. !Togarth, 6 Cowen, 248.
7Sargent vs. Gutterson, 13 N. Hamp. 467.
8 Sargent vs. Gutterson, 13 N. Hamp. 467; ante, 39. In the case last cited the
general subject is discussed with great perspicuity and ability.
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creating an interest in the suit," apply as well to criminal as to civil
cases. If a person has a legal interest in the result of the trial, he
will not be a competent witness for the prosecution.1 Thus, in
summary convictions where a penalty is imposed by statute, to the
whole or part of which the informer or persecutor is entitled in
case of conviction, he is not by the common law2 competent for the
prosecution.' But these are exceptions to the rule, which can be
better treated in another connection.
4
§ 46. (3,) Of incompetency from a relation creating an interest
in the record of the judgment to be rendered in the suit.' The
general rule in regard to using a record as evidence has been laid
down by high authority to be that "the judgment of a court of con-
current jurisdiction directly ipon the point, is as a plea in bar ; or
as evidence conclusive; between the same parties, upon the same,
matter, directly in question in another court: Secondly, that the
judgment of a court of exclusive jurisdiction directly upon the point,
is in like manner conclusive upon the same matter between the same
parties, coming incidentally in question in another court for a differ-
ent purpose." But it is added, that the judgment of neither court
is evidence of any matter which came collaterally ii question, or is
incidentaily cognizable, or of any matter to be inferred by argument
from the judgment.6 By the parties, the law means those who have
a right to make defence, to control proceedings and appeal from the
judgment.7 And, to give full effect to the principle by which parties
'Roscoe's Crim. -v. 103; 1 Phill. Ev. 61-69. As to what constitutes a legal inter-
est in certain criminal cases, see ante, 21, 29, notes.
2 R. vs. Williams, 9 B. & C. 549; Cornein vs. Paull, 4 Pick. 251; 2 Russ. on
Crimes, 601, 602. But if the penalty is to be recovered in another action, the inter-
est is too remote, and the person is competent. Rex vs. Luckeep, Willes, 425 ; 1
Phil]. Ev. 65.
3 United States vs. Patterson, 3 McLean, 53; Ibid. 299.
4 Post. 54, U. S. vs. Everest, 1 Morris, 206; U. S. vs. Murphy, 16 Peters, 302.
5 This species of incompetency no longer exists in England, having been abolished
by statute 3 & 4 Will. 4, ch. 42; s. 26, 27; 2 Taylor's Ev. 867, 950.
6 Duchess of Kingston's case, 20 How. St. Trials, 538, per De Grey, C. J. Harvey
vs. Richards, 2 Gall. 229. The rule finds an application in equity also. Pearce vs.
Gray, 2 Y. & C. 322. See generally, 1 Phill. Ev. 328, note 557, by C. & Hill,
Arnold vs. Arnold, 17 Pick. 714; Cobb vs. Arnold, 12 Met. 39.
'1 Grecnlf. Ev. 523, and if in the prior suit the party could not avail himself o
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are bound by a judgment, all persons who are represented by the
parties, or claim under them, or in privity with them, are equally
bound by the same judgment.'
But both parties must be alike bound by the judgment, or it will
bind neither.' It is a general rule that a judgment in rem, upon
the personal status or relation of the party, or "upon the title,
transfer, or disposition of property," will not only be binding upon
parties, but upon all persons.3 A verdict and judgment are always
admissible to prove the fact that the judgment was rendered, or the
verdict given, and the record is the only proper evidence of itself,
of the rendition of the judgment and of all the legal consequences
resulting from that fact. But this is widely different from using it
as evidence of the facts recited in it, which in general can be done
only in the cases just mentioned.'
§ 47. A judgment rendered in a former suit may be used by way
of inducement, or to establish a collateral fact, though- the parties
be not the same.' As in proper cases to prove the amount
which a principal has been compelled to pay by reason of the default
of his agent,6 and the allegations upon which the judgment was
rendered.7  But, unless the agent has undertaken the defence, or
has been so dealt with that he ought to have undertaken it, the judg-
ment cannot be used to prove that the agent was guilty of any thing
alleged against him, in the action against the principal.
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the same means of defence or redress which are open to him in the second suit, he
will not be bound. 1 Stark. Ev. 214, 215.
11 Greenlf. Ev. H 523, 586, 189; Lock vs. Norboine, 3 Mod. 141 ; Buller's N. P.
232; Outrum vs. IMorewood, 3 East, 353; Adams vs. Barnes, 17 Mass. 365.
2 Wood vs. Davis, 7 Crancb, 271 ; Davis vs. Wood, 1 Wheat. 6.
3 For the authorities on this point, and the reasons upon which the rule proceeds,
and the exceptions and qualifications which belong to it, see 1 Stark. Ev. 27, 28;
Story Confl. Laws H 532, 545, 551, 691; 1 Stark. Ev. 228, 232, 246-248; Story Confl.
Laws, 593; 1 Greenlf. Ev. H 525, 541, 543.
4 Greenlf. Ev. J 538, 527, 527 a, 528.
5 2 Phill. Ev. 3; Adams vs. Balch, 5 Greenlf. 188; Barr vs. Gratz, 4 Wheat. 212;
Jackson vs. Wood, 3 Wend. 27; 1 Greenlf. Ev. H 527, 404.
6 Green vs. New River Co., 4 Term 589; Draper vs. W. & N. Railroad Co., 1] Met.
505; ante, 42, notes. 1 Greenlf. Ev. H 527, 538, 539, 404; 1 Phill. Ev. 10], 102;
13 N. Hamp. 302, per Parker. Ch. J.
11 Greenlf. Ev. J 539, 404.
8 1 Stark. Ev. 114, 115; 1 Greenlf. Ev. 404; 1 Phill. Ev. 102.
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§ 48. It is a general rule, that wherever a judgment has been
rendered, affirming the existence of a custom or prescriptive right,
especially when stated on the record,' and in another suit, this cus-
tom or prescriptive right is called in question, the record of the
judgment in the former suit will be conclusive evidence of the exis-
tence of the custom or prescriptive right, thougl the parties be
different.
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§ 49. Upon the principle that an interest in the record, as an
instrument of evidence, in some other suit, renders a person incom-
petent, it may be laid down as a general rule, subject to some excep-
tions to be hereafter mentioned, that wherever the relation of a
person to the judgment to be rendered in an action is such, that in
the proper application of thd principles laid down in the last three
sections, it appears that his evidence for the party offering him
would directly tend to procure a judgment which might be used in
his favor in any action which it sufficiently appears' might be brought
by or against him, or affecting his rights, he is not a competent
witness for that party.4 Hence, where a plaintiff prescribed for
common of pasture in Hampton common, itwas held that the other
tenant who would be confirmed in a similar right, by judgment for
the plaintiff establishing the prescription in question, was not com-
petent for the plaintiff.5 So an inhabitant of a town is not compe-
tent to prove a prescription for all the inhabitants to dig clams in a
certain place,6 or to prove a prescriptive right of way for all the
inhabitants.7 So one who has made himself liable by violating a
I Lord Falmouth vs. George, 5 Bing. 286; 1 Stark. Ev. 115, note (e).
2 Greenlf. Ev. 405 ; Sargent vs. Gutterson, 13 N. Hamp. 467, where the general
question was very clearly stated; 1 Phill. Ev. 83. 84.
3Ante, 42, notes; Smith vs. Seward, 3 Barr, 312; Draper vs. W. & N. Railroad,
11 Met. 503; Holabird vs. Carrington, 17 Conn. 540.
41 Greenlf. Ev. 401; 1 Phill. Ev. 83, 84; 1 Stark. Ev. 114, 115; Cobb vs. Arnold.
12 Met. 39; Anu comb vs. Shore, 1 Taunt. 261; Parker vs. Mitchell, 11 Ad. & El.
788; Odiorne vs. Wade, 8 Pick. 518; Moore vs. Griffin, 9 Shepley, 330; Rhodes vs.
Ainsworth, 1 B. & Ald. 87; Branch vs. Doane, 17 Conn. 402.
5 Anscomb vs. Shore, 1 Taunt. 261.
OLarkin vs. Haskell, 3 Pick. 365.
7 Odiorne vs. Wade, 8 Pick. 518.
